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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
QUINN MILLET, COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, Case No. OHOl&l^ 
Judge 
LOGAN CITY, DS BRIDGERLAND 
APARTMENTS, INC., and CACHE AUTO 
BOOTING SERVICE, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff complains of the Defendants Logan City, a municipal corporation located in 
Cache County, Utah, Ds Bridgerland Apartments, Inc., a Utah corporation with its principal 
place of business in Cache County, Utah, and R and H Services, Incorporated, a Utah 
corporation with its principal place of business located in Cache County, Utah, doing business as 
Cache Auto Booting Service, and alleges as follows: 
* * * 
1. Some of the Claims for Relief arise under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States; Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 1983 and 
Article I Sec. 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the federal questions raised hereunder pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. Sec. 1331. 
3. At all times pertinent hereto, the Plaintiff was an adult over the age of eighteen years, 
a resident of the State of Utah, a citizen of the United States of America and a student at Utah 
State University and all the acts complained of herein occurred in Cache County. 
4. On the 15th day of November, 2000 the Logan Municipal Council (hereafter 
"Council") adopted and the Mayor approved Ordinance No. 2000-75 (Revised 11/15/00) titled 
"AN ORDINANCE AMENDING LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 10.52.040 TO 
INCLUDE REGULATION OF BOOTING PRACTICES IN THE CITY OF LOGAN", 
hereinafter called the "Ordinance", a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The 
Ordinance became effective by publication on the 24th day of November, 2000 and continues in 
effect. The Ordinance is unconstitutional on the grounds hereinafter detailed. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B" is a copy of the booting ordinance parts of the official minutes of nine Logan City 
Council meetings (hereafter called "minutes" or "record") that led to the adoption of the 
ordinance. Exhibits "A" and "B" are incorporated herein by this reference. The meetings covered 
a period of over fifteen months. 
5. The Plaintiff has standing to contest the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Plaintiffs 
car was seized and immobilized by booting by the Defendant Cache Auto Booting Service 
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(hereafter "Booter") acting for, and in the parking lot of Plaintiff s landlord, Defendant D's 
Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. (hereafter "Landlord"), located in the City. The booting occurred 
on the 10th day of September, 2003. The Booter then extorted $50.00 from Plaintiff as a 
condition for the return of his (illegally) seized-booted car. The booting and extortion was done 
by the Landlord and its Booter under the color of the authority of the unconstitutional Ordinance. 
6. The Ordinance has three parts. This action challenges the constitutionality of parts one 
and two only: The first is that part applied to the booting of Plaintiffs car under sub-sections D 1 
and 2, which purports to conditionally legalize booting by landlords and their private booters 
who make the individual booting decisions; also E, licensing and regulating booters; and F, 
regulating landlords who boot under the ordinance. This first part is sometimes referred to herein 
as "private profit booting". The second part under D 3 provides for City police directed booting 
on public streets to enforce payment of five unpaid parking violation fines, sometimes referred to 
as "police directed booting". The third part where constitutionality is not challenged herein is 
under A and authorizes police officers to seize "nuisance" vehicles "wherever found" by towing 
and impoundment. 
7. The private profit booting and police directed booting parts of the Ordinance violate 
due process because seizure of vehicles by booting is a taking of property where post seizure 
procedural due process notice and hearing must be provided in the ordinance and is totally absent 
in these parts of this Ordinance. See "Fuentes" v. Shevin, 92 S.Ct 1983, 32 L.Ed. 2d 556 (1972); 
"Mathews" v. Eldridge 424 U. S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893,47 L Ed.2nd 19 (1976); "Sutton" v. City of 
Milwaukee, 672 F. 2nd 644 (CA Wise. 1982); "Saukstelis" v. City of Chicago, 932 F 2nd 1171, C. 
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A. 7 (111, 1991); "Gillam" v. Landrieu 455 F Supp. 1030, D.C. La. 1978; "Patterson" v. Cronin 
650 P 2d 531 (Colo. 1982); "Wilson" v. City of New Orleans 479 So. 2d 891, (La. 1985); and 
"Haefner" v. APCOA Parking Inc. et. al. N. Y.S. 2d 605, 130 Misc. 2d 203 (N. Y. 1986). Seizing 
vehicles by towing and booting have the same constitutional consequences. 
8. The first part purporting to legalize booting by private property owners and their 
private booters (referred to hereafter for brevity as the"Ordinance"), violates due process on the 
following additional independent grounds: 
8.1. The private profit booting part of the Ordinance is a total "surrender" or 
"abdication" of the City's control over its police power of legitimate force in the seizure of 
vehicles, in that it grants to private "business licensed" booters with a private profit motive the 
decision to initiate each seizure rather than vesting that decision in a government official 
responsible for determining, under standards of a narrowly drawn ordinance, that seizure is 
necessary and justified in each case, as required by due process. See cases cited in the previous 
paragraph generally. Regarding the surrender of police power see State v. Board of Education of 
Salt Lake City, 60 P. 1013 (Utah 1900). This Ordinance is a far more extreme violation of this 
principal than is found in any reported case. In Fuentes, Wilson and Haefner, there was a 
plausible argument, rejected by the courts, that the seizure-decision-maker was a government 
official. In all other reported cases the decision-maker was a government official and they turn 
on whether or not the ordinance detail provides for post-seizure due-process-conforming notice 
and hearing. In this ordinance there is not even the pretext of official seizure decision-making. 
The seizure decision is made by a specially business-licensed, profit-seeking, hooter, from 
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who's profit-motivated decision the victim is provided no hearing or remedy. This is a pure, 
unadulterated, total surrender and abdication by the City of it's police power monopoly of 
legitimate force. 
8.2. The Ordinance is an arbitrary, capricious and irrational due process denial in that it; 
(1) allows a landlord to issue more (no limit) parking permits to tenants than the landlord has 
parking spaces, often forcing tenants into illegal parking without prior notice, (2) allows total 
denial of visitor parking, even for short term drop off, pickup, or business with the manager, (3) 
places on tenants the burden of giving previous notice to visitors, (4) makes no requirement for 
the booters, landlords, or any public office or official to maintain any record of the forceful 
seizures or payment of the extorted fees, (5) only requires booters to give the victims a receipt 
for the fee paid if requested and they need not even give their address, (6) is based on the false 
premise that a property owner has a right to a self help remedy for every trespassing or illegal 
vehicle on his premises, (7) falsely assumes that tenants' and visitors' vehicles are trespassing or 
illegally on the property, when at most their vehicles might be in violation of the landlord's 
private parking rules; (8) authorizes booters to impersonate police officers without uniform, 
badge, or car markings, and (9) vests booters with the police power to seize vehicles in a way 
that goes beyond what even the police could do. 
8.3. The Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad and not narrowly drawn in 
that it; (1) fails to require reasonable notice to victims requiring only that landlords "post 'a' 
conspicuous sign on the landlord's property", without specifying multiple postings at places 
most likely to give actual notice to victims such as at entries to and from the parking lots or at the 
5 
L 
parking spaces, and, (2) applies initially to all "property owners" including businesses with 
customer parking, and commercial fee parking but then switches the notice and regulation 
provisions requirements to the limited "landlord- (student) tenant" situation (the primary 
targeted victims) and is totally devoid of any notice or standards tailored to business and 
commercial parking owners. 
9. The private booting part of the Ordinance provides the color of authority for the 
unlawful seizure of vehicles by property owner's agent booters, and thus violates the unlawful 
search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment. 
10. The record reveals that extensive landlord parking enforcement by booting predated 
the Ordinance. The moving force that resulted in the Ordinance adoption were pleas and 
complaints to the Council, police agencies, and the City and County Attorney's offices from 
Utah State University students seeking relief and protection from abusive, unfair and illegal 
practices of booters who were booting under the pretext of the landlords' claims to a common-
law self-help remedy for parking violations (Ex."B" pg.l). In the end the Council betrayed the 
students' pleas for relief, ignored the Deputy County Attorney's (hereafter "Linton") opinion 
that it was illegal, bowed to the interests of the landlords, the booters and the police, disregarded 
the constitutional limitations on their power and surrendered the police power monopoly of 
legitimate force to the landlords and their booters. 
11. The pretense justifying pre-ordinance common law booting was that a landlord's 
booter can summarily seize vehicles on the landlords property, charge a "fee" for its services and 
release the vehicle if the vehicle is violating the landlord's parking rules. As a general rule, the 
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law prohibits all private citizens from settling their disputes by forceful means and commands 
them to resort to the judicial process. As for governments, the Constitution invests them with the 
sole title to legitimate force with constraints and inhibitions including the requirement of 
providing due process of law. There is a common law exception to this general rule that allows 
one who suffers a "special injury" resulting from a vehicle occupying his assigned-leased 
parking stall or obstructs the entrance-exit to it, the summary "self-help" remedy of booting or 
removal by towing. It is the tenant who's right to possession of the stall, not the landlord, who 
suffers the "special injury" and who may invoke this extra-ordinary common law self help 
remedy. The car of the landlord or another tenant could be self-help booted by the specially-
injured tenant assigned the wrongfully-occupied stall. In this respect the Council ignored a 
comment that this booting scheme violated a tenant's right to a leased parking stall (Ex. "B" pg. 
8). Whether or not there is the requisite special injury that justifies self help or whether the 
means employed is reasonable under the circumstances depends on the facts and circumstances 
as they appear to the court from the evidence in each case. A self helper assumes the risk 
inherent in going over the line. If they boot in a case where it is judicially determined that there 
is no common-law "special injury", they are converting and extorting in a civil sense and at risk 
of committing the criminal offenses of car theft and theft of money by extortion. 
12. A few landlords in the city, apparently with legal advice, have structured both pre-
and post-Ordinance parking control in conformity with their common law property rights. In one 
case they rent stalls separate from the apartments, a possible solution where there are not 
sufficient stalls for all tenants. In another case each tenant's assigned stall is posted with a notice 
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for the tenant to call the booter if wrongfully occupied. There are many other alternative 
solutions for landlords within the ambit of competitive free enterprise and the common law. In 
private business customer parking lots (circa Eccles Theater etc.) there is no "special injury" to 
the business after business hours. The "special injury" in commercial fee parking lots is the loss 
of an economic opportunity. In this regard, "Janice Pearce (Council person) said she particularly 
did not like the fact that the regulations interfered with private enterprise". The City Attorney 
then explained that the City "wanted to bring regulation to a system that was then unregulated 
and appeared to be abused" (Ex. "B" pg. 2). What resulted was that the City purported to 
validate, "legalize" and give police protection to outrageously illegal, criminal, and 
unconstitutional seizures and extortion practices of landlords and booters. Since the adoption of 
the Ordinance the "abusers" now also hide behind the color of authority or pretext of the 
Ordinance. 
13. The hated abuse the City proposed to politically "regulate" by this legislation was in 
fact and law, rampant, illegal, and criminal seizing of vehicles and extortion of money from 
victims, committed by politically powerful landlords and their agent booters, primarily against 
poor and defenseless students under the pretense of the non-extant authority of the common law. 
In the legal system, the county attorney, the city attorney, and all enforcement agencies had a 
duty to define the line between legitimate common-law self-help booting and theft, conversion 
and extortion, and then give notice to landlords and booters as to where the line was drawn. 
Then, having so given notice, prosecute the continuing landlord-booter thieves and extortionists 
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with vigor. In addition, that legal line drawing should have been the basis for law enforcement 
responses to victims' complaints. 
14. The Council's and public attorneys' willful disregard of the students rights to freedom 
from rampant theft and extortion in favor of whatever the landlords and booters wanted is clearly 
exposed by the record. In the first meeting Linton opined that booting was unfair and illegal. 
Then: "He said he did not agree with booting, but if it had to be done to protect landlord's 
interests, there misht be room for compromise" (Ex. "B" pg. 1). The next eight meetings over 
fifteen months detail how the "compromise" of students rights to freedom from this tyranny 
surged far beyond compromise. It ended in the Ordinance and total capitulation, in or der to 
protect the landlords interests. 
15. The duty of the city and county public prosecutors to define the line between legal 
common law self help booting and theft and extortion, and then give notice to and prosecute 
continuing offenders was absolute and non-discretionary. This is especially true in this case 
where, by the County Attorney's own record assessment; "booting was a problem and a real 
public safety issue in his opinion because of the violent reactions it caused" ( Ex. "B" pg. 3). If 
these public attorneys had trouble drawing the line because of the complexity of the legal 
research involved or local political pressure from landlords, the Council, and others, they had a 
right to shift that research opinion burden or blame to the Attorney General. But after the line 
was drawn and notice was given, the local prosecutors were duty bound to curb the practices 
regardless of the local political incorrectness. 
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16. The legality and property-rights issues that surfaced in the first meeting were never 
again raised or resolved on the record. One of the principal duties of public attorneys is to insure 
by due professional diligence that proposed legislation is not in conflict with higher legal and 
constitutional norms. In the performance of this sworn duty of public trust, these lawyers are 
duty bound to protect the political bodies they advise from acting beyond their authority. At the 
same time they protect the average citizens whose rights are otherwise at grave risk, and who pay 
the public attorneys' and other officials' salaries. 
17. If the public attorneys had performed their duties with even minimum due diligence 
the Council would have dropped any further consideration of the private-profit booting part of 
the Ordinance. In that first meeting, Council person Pearce; "wondered if booting infringed 
upon personal property rights". Linton said booting "was unfair and an 'illegal lien' under state 
law". Then a city attorney opined "that with the adoption of a City ordinance the issue of 
illegality would be removed . . . He did not accept the premise [of the county attorney] that 
booting was illegal." (Ex."B" pg. 1). The constitutionality and legality issues were clearly raised 
and joined. The Council was never provided nor requested any response to those legal limitation 
issues in any of the eight subsequent meetings. The two public attorneys had a duty to research 
and report. If it was still "illegal" after due-diligence research, as Linton opined, he had a duty to 
protect the victims, prosecute the perpetrators, advise law enforcement on proper responses to 
victims complaints, and advise all concerned of the results. The assistant city attorney 
"Housley", who counter-opined that even if illegal, the ordinance would make booting legal had 
the same due-diligence duties to do the research, report, and act, even if the results varied from 
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his first opinion, and even if he knew that was not what the Council, landlords and booters 
wanted to hear. Neither attorney reported any such due-diligence findings back to the Council. 
How difficult and time-consuming would due diligence research on this critical public safety 
issue have been? Without conflict, all the reported cases support the allegations of this 
complaint. It is not a typical gray area of the law where you find reported cases on both sides of 
the issues. 
16. Because these legal safeguards against abuse of political power failed, the Council 
and their committee ventured off into eight more meetings of politically motivated "group 
think", unrestrained by any limitations on their legal or constitutional authority. The resulting 
Ordinance promoted the interests of the politically powerful landlords and booters against the 
poor defenseless students under the pretext that the Council was "regulating" by legislation the 
booters' admittedly abusive practices. In law and fact, rather than limit the abuses, they provided 
the deceptive color of authority for the politically powerful to continue and expand their illegal 
and unconstitutional seizing of the students' vehicles and extortion of their scarce money. The 
council chose a course in which the victims had no practical redress. The Ordinance provided 
affirmative police protection to the thieves and extorters. The record from beginning to end 
expressly supports this conclusion. 
17. In regard to civil rights, this record exposes a very broad aggravated and fundamental 
disregard by local government officials of legal and constitutional limitations on their power 
over the property rights of poor students. It appears that the only subject areas where they 
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carefully observe constitutional limitations is out of fear of retaliation by the ACLU, an 
organization chartered to protect First Amendment type rights but not property rights. 
18. This pattern is clearly documented in the record. Council member Pearce suggested a 
Council committee of students, and booters, chaired it and expanded it to also include an 
apartment manager, and two apartment owners, but included no lawyers and reported back that 
there was little consensus. She reported that the first way for improving the situation was 
"Educating University Students" to the reality of booting. Ironically, none of the Council 
members ever showed any interest in becoming educated in the "legality or illegality" of booting 
though the red flag was raised. Council-person Borg "commented that all the changes to the 
ordinance appeared to reflect what the booter...wanted" (Ex."B" pg. 4 ). Borg later commented 
"that she hated the ordinance" (Ex. "B" pg. 5). She never asked the attorneys or anyone if there 
was a legal basis for her hate. In the end she voted for both the first and revised ordinances. 
Pearce in the end abstained as the chair though she voted yes on the first ordinance (Ex. "B" pg. 
9) without ever having her wondering about personal property rights infringements answered 
(Ex."B"pg. 1). 
19. The whole record displays a willful if not wanton disregard by these public officials 
(including attorneys) of their first sworn duty to "support, obey and defend Constitution of the 
United States" ( Utah Const. Art. IV Sec. 10), if doing so places any limits on their authority. In 
this isolated local-government environment (see Haefher), one is left to question whether the city 
attorneys (appointed) would have been fired, or the county attorney (elected) been voted out if 
they had held the elected officials to the legal and constitutional limits of their authority. 
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20. Even though the Ordinance permits the use of violence by non-official private 
persons in ways that the police cannot do, and in ways totally foreign to and offensive to and 
even hated in our society, the city attorneys were bystanders in the drafting and redrafting 
process. The gravity, repulsiveness and violence-inciting potential of private-profit booting 
should have been a clue to all that there were serious and profound legal and constitutional 
questions to be addressed and resolved before proceeding further. In effect, the County Attorney 
stated that the "illegal" booting violence was inciting victim violence and fomenting a serious 
public safety problem. Borg said she "hated" the ordinance. Pearce wondered if it violated 
personal property rights. Other similar comments were threaded through the process (Ex."B"). 
Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that constitutional and illegality issues were raised and never 
answered, no directions were given to the city attorney to take responsibility for the drafting or 
redrafting of the proposed ordinance except for the end change requested by the council related 
to landlords informing tenants (Ex. "B" pg. 9). Neither did he volunteer. It was the chief of 
police who prepared and proposed the first draft according to the record. It was the chief and his 
lieutenant who juggled, pulled out and stuffed in the critical parts that had profound legal 
consequences. It was the police who were asked and answered the critical legal questions as the 
process advanced. A city attorney was present at all meetings and appears to have been a mere 
bystander as critical legal questions raced across the stage and were answered by the police. 
This private-force-authorizing Ordinance as adopted has all the earmarks of a cut and paste 
product of the chief of police and his lieutenant. It has none of the earmarks of an ordinance 
crafted by due-diligence professional public attorneys. Apparently the Council and Mayor see 
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the city attorney's limited roles as figurehead technicians. They never asked for educated, 
informed answers to obvious and critical legal questions. They appear to disregard the attorneys' 
legal role of defining and imposing legal and constitutional limits on the scope of the city's 
authority. 
21. With regard to civil rights, the record in this case documents and exposes a systemic 
and fundamental flaw in the functioning of local government in this isolated community that 
places in great jeopardy a broad range of constitutional and civil rights that extends far beyond 
the confines of the narrow but aggravated unconstitutional booting issue, and from which the 
multitudes of victims have no practical or affordable remedy. 
22. There is a pathetic irony in the record where the Council, after closing their eyes and 
ears to becoming "educated" in the constitutional prohibitions against legislating private profit 
booting-extortion practices, nevertheless concurs in the committee report that the first solution to 
the booting abuse problem is "Educating University Students" to the reality of booting (Ex. "B" 
pg. 4). The prosecution of this action is a direct result of those students (many victims) repeated, 
passionate and angry pleas to their law "educator", in and out of class, insisting that booting 
violates their constitutional rights as taught to them in the classroom and in the text. The current 
text case on due process is Mathews. Fuentes is in a former text. The "education" obtained by the 
students at USU demonstrates to them that booting, as experienced by them in Logan City, is 
illegal. This knowledge, coupled with the lack of a remedy for the illegal wrongs perpetrated on 
them with Logan City's complicity with and protection of the thieves and extortionists, serves to 
fuel the temptation to violent reactions, a danger to public safety noted by the County Attorney ( 
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Ex. "B" pg. 6). Restraint has become more difficult with the passage of time and no apparent, 
affordable legal remedy in sight. 
23. The limited relief sought in this action is a major first step in the vindication of the 
constitutional rights of a very large class of victims of private-profit booting ordinances. In 
addition to Logan they are in force in Provo and Orem and likely some other Utah cities. Utah 
State University's booting regulation has the same basic defect in that it is not narrowly drawn to 
exclude the private booter from making the decision to boot in each particular case. This option 
is left open in the regulation. It does not require a police officer booting decision. If successful 
this action will nullify the Ordinance and stop the unconstitutional booting now done under the 
color of authority of this Ordinance. It will also provide a precedent for other court actions that 
can provide remedies and damages for the multitudes of victims. It could also have the positive 
effect of convincing the other violating cities and government entities to voluntarily discontinue 
and repeal their unconstitutional private-profit booting ordinances. 
24. The issues regarding who may be liable for damages and the kind, measure and types 
of damages that the victims may be entitled to in a class action or other types of actions is 
beyond the scope of this action. The justification for the damages prayed for against the City is 
based upon the fact that the City has no governmental immunity under Sec. 63-30-3 UCA. That 
governmental immunity act only gives cities immunity for "injury which results from the 
exercise of a governmental function ". The act provides the City no immunity for an injury 
which results from the total surrender or abdication of the governmental function of the use of 
force to private landlords and private-profiteering booters as in this case. The justification for 
15 
/ / 
damages from the Landlord is that it has no immunity, is charged with notice of the laws he was 
violating, and unlike the poor victims has the financial resources with which to get legal advice. 
The same basis for liability applies to the Booter. 
25. Plaintiff is still attending USU, the practice of private booting of vehicles continues, 
and Plaintiff, in the course of his normal activities, is subject to being booted in the jfuture absent 
the granting of the relief requested below. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and demands judgment against Defendants as 
follows: 
1. For a declaration that the first and second parts of the Ordinance legislating private 
booting, and police booting are unconstitutional, null and void, and that all licenses issued 
thereunder are null and void. 
2. For a permanent injunction restraining Logan City from enforcing the first two parts 
the Ordinance, requiring Logan City to repeal those two parts of the ordinance, revoking hooters' 
licenses and ceasing and desisting from providing police protection to landlords and booters 
acting under the color of authority of the Ordinance. 
3. For a permanent injunction restraining Defendant Landlord from authorizing or 
ordering the booting of vehicles under the color of the authority of the Ordinance. 
4. For a permanent injunction restraining Defendant Booter from booting vehicles under 
the color of the authority of the Ordinance. 
5. For a judgment of fifty dollars ($50.00) as compensatory damages against all 
defendants, jointly and severally. 
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6. For a judgment of one dollar ($1.00) in nominal damages against Defendant Logan 
City. 
7. For a judgment of one dollar ($1.00) in nominal damages against Defendant Landlord. 
8. For a judgment of one dollar ($1.00) in nominal damages against Defendant Booter. 
9. For an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1988 incurred herein. And 
10. For such other and further relief to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled. 
DATED September 16, 2004. 
DATED September 16, 2004. 
Chris Daines 
Co-counsel for Plaintiff 
Davixtit. Daines 
Co-counsel for Plaintiff 
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CITY OF LOGAN 
ORDINANCE NO. 2000-75 (Revised 11/15/00) 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 10.52.040, 
TO INCLUDE REGULATION OF BOOTING PRACTICES IN THE CITY OF LOGAN 
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 
LOGAN AS FOLLOWS: 
SECTION I: Section 10.52.040, Abatement of Nuisance Vehicles - Impounding, is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
10.52.040 Regulation of impounding and booting practices. 
A. Every police officer of the city is authorized summarily to seize and take possession 
of every abandoned or illegally parked or operated vehicle, which are declared to be 
an obstruction to traffic and a nuisance, wherever found, by removing or causing such 
vehicle to be removed and impounded in any authorized vehicle pound. Every police 
officer of the city is also further authorized to seize and take possession of any 
vehicle which is being operated upon the public streets of the city with improper 
registration, or which the officer has good reason to believe has been stolen, or on 
which any motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark has been 
defaced, altered or obliterated, and to remove or cause such vehicle to be removed 
and impounded in any authorized vehicle pound. Every police officer so impounding 
a vehicle shall within twenty-four hours make a written report thereof to the chief of 
police specifying the manufacturer's trade name and model of the impounded vehicle, 
its license and motor number, if available, the time and place where the vehicle was 
taken and impounded, and the cause of the impounding. 
B. Definition: 
"Booting" means to place any immobilization device upon a motor vehicle not 
registered to the person placing the immobilization device for purposes of parking 
enforcement. 
C. Exceptions: 
This section shall not apply to any parking regulations as established by a college or 
university pursuant to Title 53B, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann. 
D. It shall be unlawful for any property owner or designee to boot any motor vehicle that 
is trespassing or infringing upon the real property rights of that property owner 
without complying with this section. 
1. Private parking lots which contain four (4) or more parking spaces and which 
use booting of vehicles for parking enforcement shall post a conspicuous sign 
on the landlord's property. Such sign will provide notice, with reflective 
background, that unauthorized vehicles will be booted. At a minimum, 
signage shall: 
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a. provide sufficient information to assist vehicle owners in the prompt 
recovery of any vehicle booted; 
b. be at least 12" x 18" in size. 
2. After a boot is placed on any vehicle, the parking enforcement company shall: 
a. provide a notice affixed to the boot or vehicle containing the name and 
telephone number of the firm that placed the boot on the vehicle, as well 
as the amount of the fee required to remove the boot; 
b. maintain personnel authorized to remove any boot and release any vehicle 
to its owner or driver upon the payment of any authorized fee except as 
provided in subsection 3; 
c. once payment is made, provide a receipt upon request of individual 
making payment for removal of the boot. 
3. The City of Logan or its designee may leave a boot in place until payment of 
parking fines issued pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Section 10.52.290 are 
satisfied. 
a. The City of Logan or its designee may only attach a boot in accordance 
with this ordinance on public property. 
b. Vehicles may only be booted by the City of Logan or its designee 
following (5) five written citations and a written notice for the violations. 
E. Any parking enforcement company desiring to boot vehicles within Logan City shall: 
Obtain a business license in the City of Logan; and register its business name, 
telephone number, either an address or a P.O. Box number, and fee schedules with 
Logan City. In the event of a change in business name, telephone number, address or 
P.O. Box number, or fee schedules, such company shall register such information 
with the Logan City Business License Department within ten (10) days. 
1. Failure to comply with any provision of this section shall constitute grounds 
for suspension or revocation of the business license of any company licensed 
under this section to conduct parking enforcement service in Logan City. 
2. A parking enforcement company shall not charge a fee in excess of any fee 
listed in the fee schedule for booting a vehicle. 
3. A parking enforcement company shall not charge any fee related to the 
booting of a vehicle that is not listed in the fee schedule. 
4. The maximum authorized fee for booting a vehicle shall be $50.00 for up to 
twenty-four hours. 
5. Charges for damages to booting equipment shall not be governed by this 
ordinance and shall not prevent the vehicle's release if scheduled fees are 
satisfied. 
F. Landlords who engage a private parking enforcement company to boot illegally 
parked vehicles on their property shall inform their tenants of the booting practice and 
make available instructions on how to comply with the law. 
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1. A parking permit shall be provided to each tenant with instructions as to 
where that permit should be displayed in the automobile; 
2. Tenants shall be provided with a written schedule of fees charged by the 
parking enforcement company; 
3. Tenants shall be provided with instructions regarding visitor parking or will 
be informed if no visitor parking is available; 
4. Tenants shall be provided with a method for replacing a lost permit; 
landlords/managers may charge a fee for such replacement; the replacement 
fee must be made known to tenants at the time they receive their parking 
permits. 
G. Violation of any provision of this section is a Class B Misdemeanor. 
SECTION 2: Effective Date. This ordinance shall become effective upon publication. 
PASSED BY THE LOGAN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, STATE OF UTAH, THIS 
(S - OF HH^JHA) 2000. 
Janio^Pearce, Chairman 
Lois Price, City Recorder 
PRESENTATION TO MAYOR 
The foregoing ordinance was presented by the Logan Municipal Council to the 
Mayor for approval or disapproval on the day of _ Affilf ' 2000. 
/ <*?^SCY /Jtr^cP^A-az. 
Jank^JJearce, Chairman 
MAYOR'S APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL 
The foregoing ordinance is hereby approved this f5** day of MnA 2000. 
Dotigfas Ii. ^Thompson 
/ 
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PROOF OF PUBLICATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE 
On this . Zkthay of ? S Y £ ! P k $ £ A.O. . 2 0 0 0 
personolly oppeorcd before mo J$an . W l l l l l lOr £
 w h 0 boin^ first duly sworn. 
deposes end soys ihol she is the chief clork of ihc Coche Volley Publishing Co.. publishers of The Harold Journal 
o daily newspaper published in logon. Cify. Cache Counfy Ulan, ond that the odvcrJiscmcnJ 
LEGAL NOTICE 
o copy of which is hereto attached, was published in soid 
ac^ipopcr lac One..( L ) . . . i«s sue 
commencing . . JJo.Vejub^r. . 2 4 > . 2QQfid 
ending ¥ P T £ ? . b . ? F . . Z/tj.. ? 0 0 0 ^ 
Signed . t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J . . . ix^JdLL (frit&Jr? 
Subscrjl>ea ond sworn to before mo. the doy ond year 
obovc written. 
Signed 
Notary Public. 
My Commiuion expires . . .§epjtember. .7». 2Q03.. 
'~-' ' . 1 . H ^ 
'JO/ 
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LEGAL NOTICE 
SUMMARIES or ordi-
nances adopted by the 
Logan Municfpaf Coun-
cil are as follows: 
1. ORD. 00-75 RE-
VISED. An ordinance 
was adopted October 
18, 2000 amending 
Logan Municipal Code, 
1989 to include Section 
10.52.040, "Regulation 
of Impounding and 
Booting Practices." It 
was amended Novem-
ber 15, 2000 to clarify 
language. Also, subsec-
tion "F" was added 
dealing with landlords 
who engage a private 
parking enforcement 
company to boot illegal-
ly parked vehicles on 
their property. They are 
required to inform ten-
ants of the booting 
practice and make 
available instruction on 
how to comply the law 
by providing: 
A. Permits and instruc-
tions as to where to dis-
play them; 
B. Written schedule of 
fees charged by park-
ing enforcement com-
pany; 
C. Instructions regard-
ing visitor parking or will 
be informed if none is 
available, 
D. Method of replacing 
lost permit. 
Violation of the ordi-
nance section is a 
Class B Misdemeanor 
2, ORD. 00-88. An or-
dinance was adopted 
November 15, 2000 to 
amend Section 
6.12.180, "Dogs Run-
ning at Large" to in-
clude other animals as 
weff as dogs. The 
amendment provides 
that it shall be the abso-
lute responsibility of 
those who keep dogs 
or other animals to 
prevent them from run-
ning at large in the city. 
It stipulates that it is un-
lawful for any person to 
own, harbor or keep 
dogs or other animals 
which run at large in 
the city or to permit 
dogs or other animals 
to run at large. 
3. ORD. 00-85. An or-
dinance was adopted 
November 1, 2000, va-
cating a certain right-of-
way located south of 
Golf Course Road at 
100 West and de-
scribed as follows: 
Located in Block 3, Plat 
HB" of the Providence 
Farm Survey. The City 
wishes to abandon all 
of the "Old Field Road" 
right-of-way on Parcel 
02-064-0014, as 
recorded in the Cache 
County Recorder's Of-
fice as Entry 608/60, 
and Parcel 02-064-
0009, as recorded in 
the Cache County 
Recorder's Office as 
Entry 498/987 
Also a part of the "Old 
Field Road" right-of-
way that will not be 
used as the new 100 
West Street, on Parcel 
02-085-0001, as 
recorded in the Cache 
County Recorder's Of-
fice as Entry 792-624 
This ordinance is cc 
gent on the dedic 
of all rights-of-way 
essary for the rea 
ment of the new 
West Street, inck 
sidewalks and pa 
strips to City Stands 
These ordinances 
become effective 
publication. 
Full text of these 
nances may be 
viewed at the Offi 
the Logan 
Recorder, City Hall 
North Main, Logai 
during regular c 
hours. 
Lois Price, Record€ 
Publication Date: 
November 24, 200 
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(U) Lo&m Municipal Council Logan, Utah August 4,1999 
Vehicle Booting Ordinance - 99-83 
Police Chief Rich Hendricks introduced an ordinance which, if passed, would regulate 
vehicle booting practices in the City, in public and private parking lots, with the exception of 
university parking lots, A "boot" is a lock attached to the wheel of a vehicle, immobilizing it. 
Janice Pearce wondered if the ordinance infringed upon personal property rights. Chief 
Hendricks explained booting was going on in the City and needed to be regulated. "We receive 
complaints about it and need a level of consistency," he said. The ordinance was proposed as a 
starting point for the Council, Hendricks added. He mentioned some issues to discuss were: 
booting of public and private lots; signage and size of signs; providing receipts for payment; and 
maximum fees. Among issues not addressed in the ordinance were requiring booting businesses to 
accept checks and credit cards, and length of time boot could remain on the vehicle. 
Karen Borg supported limiting the public use of booting. "I don't like this kind of tool 
being used in behalf of the City," she said. 
Attorney Don Linton of the County Attorney's Office spoke about his frustrations with 
booting, which he said was unfair and an "illegal lien" under state law. He said tow was permitted 
by State law, but the practice of booting was not specifically allowed under State law. Attorney 
Linton said the County Attorney's Office was inundated with complaints from those whose 
vehicles had been booted. He supported an, ordinance but said he was not sure he liked the one 
proposed. He said he did not agree with booting, but if it had to be done to protect landlord's 
interests, there might be room for compromise. 
Attorney H o u s e s opinion was that with adoption of a City ordinance the issue of 
illegality would be removed. He did not accept the premise that booting was illegal, since if a sign 
was posted, those who parked in the lot had been put on notice. The City, he said, wanted to 
protect consumers by setting standards for footing. 
Karen Borg suggested rescheduling this many-sided problem for discussion at a workshop. 
Brady Pearce, owner of Cache Valley Booting Service, said he had been in business since 
1994, booting vehicles for owners of student rentals. He said signs were posted in the parking lots 
he worked in. He talked about the hardship imposed if the maximum fee for his services was $40. 
He spoke about what he did not like about the proposed ordinance. 
Randy Weston, owner of Old Farm, student housing apartments located east of Romney 
Stadium, spoke in support of the booting service. He said booting was the best answer he had 
found to bad parking problems at student apartments. "We simply are trying to deal with the 
problem of keeping those who don't belong in our parking lot out of it. . .Without him (the 
booting service) we are back to square one... towing." 
Ryan Dent, past ASUSU President, asked for more time to review the ordinance. 
Discussion centered around difficult situations and confrontations between students and Mr. 
Pierce. 
The Council decided to discuss the ordinance again at its August 25 meeting and asked for 
public comment prior to the meeting. 
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LoganMunicipal Council Logan, Utah August 25,1999 
VEHICLE BOOTING ORDINANCE. Chairman Thompson opened the meeting to 
discussion of a proposed vehicle booting ordinance for public and private parking control and said 
minimal public comment would be accepted. Janice Pearce and John Harder did not see a need for 
the ordinance. Karen Borg and Alan Allred supported an ordinance of sonie type. Janice Pearce 
said she particularly did not like the fact that the regulations interfered with private enterprise. 
Karen Borg wanted to eliminate the use of this enforcement tool in public parking areas. She 
said it was "heavy-handed" 
Attorney Mark Sorenson explained the administration wanted to bring reasonable 
regulation to a system that was now unregulated and appeared to be abused. 
There was discussion about setting a maximum fee which could be charged by the booter. 
Karen Borg thought $40 might be too high. 
Craig Davis of Clancy, the City's public parking lot enforcement contractor, said the 
ordinance was a necessary tool in public parking lots to control habitual parking violators. 
Shawn Sorenson said he had managed apartments for years. He talked about why booting 
was done and the difficulty in managing parking at apartments. His experience was that booting 
was effective and the ordinance was not needed. 
John Harder was excused at 8:30 p.m. for another appointment. 
Vince Larsen of AFs Trophies, said Clancy did an "outstanding" job of parking 
management in the Centerblock parking lot. He did not like the idea of booting vehicles in that 
city-owned lot. 
Ryan Dent, past ASUSU President, supported the ordinance. He believed details needed 
to be worked out but booting needed to be regulated for consistency. 
Quentin Casperson said booting in the Centerblock public parking lot would be detrimental 
to downtown business. 
The Council agreed that more discussion needed to take place on the ordinance and 
scheduled it as a workshop item on the September 1 meeting agenda. 
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DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED VEHICLE BOOTING ORDINANCE. 
There was a lengthy discussion about the proposed vehicle booting ordinance. 
Karen Borg said she was convinced an ordinance was needed but did not support booting 
as a public parking enforcement tool, except to have some leverage over repeat violators, and she 
favored establishing a dollar level at which this type of enforcement would be permitted. 
Chairman Thompson allowed County Attorney Scott Wyatt to comment on the issue. He 
said booting was a problem and a real public safety issue in his opinion because of the violent 
reactions it caused. For that reason, he supported limited booting after a certain number of 
warnings. He suggested the city's contract parking authority might, upon, request, write tickets 
in private parking lots as warnings. He commented about signage and said he did not think a sign 
could be required that was large enough to warn someone who parked improperly in a private lot 
after 11 p.m. that their vehicle might be booted. Councilmember Allred spoke about his concerns 
relating to Attorney Wyatt's suggestions, pointing out that landlords had emphasized the need for 
the booting service to control parking in their lots. It was mentioned during the discussion that 
not booting also represented a security risk to those students who must park away from their 
premises because the stalls were occupied by non-residents. 
Councilmember Allred said he could support booting in public parking lots after a 
designated number of tickets had been issued and not paid. Discussion centered around what 
individual Councilmembers saw as problems with the ordinance and suggestions for changes were 
made. A majority supported: (1) Adding an exception that booting would not be used on public 
streets or public parking lots until five tickets were issued and not paid; (2) Eliminating 
requirement for booter to notify the Police Department when vehicles were booted; (3) Minimum 
size of signs posted at private parking lots regarding booting be 12Mxl8M; (4) All private parking 
lots using booting would be required to post conspicuous signage; (5) Booting company would 
not be required to have the business location printed on the notice affixed to the booted vehicle; 
(6) Maximum fee for booting a vehicle would not be regulated. Councilmember Borg asked that 
it be noted that she was not part of the majority agreeing to the foregoing. Neither was Chairman 
Thompson. 
Councilmember Borg said she would not vote for an ordinance without stipulation of a 
maximum fee for booting a vehicle. Councilmembers Harder and Pearce did not feel an ordinance 
was necessary. Chairman Thompson encouraged members of the audience to contact 
Councilmembers about proposed changes He scheduled the ordinance for the September 22 
agenda, 
Janice Pearce suggested a committee of students, City Council, and booting company 
representatives meet. Councilmember Pearce was asked by Chairman Thompson to chair the 
committee. He asked to be invited to the meeting. Mayor Thompson commented that the 
administration had worked for several months in an attempt to mediate this situation among the 
various parties but had not been able to find common ground. 
It was agreed to defer action on the proposed ordinance until a report was received from 
Councilmembers Pearce and Thompson 
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VEHICLE BOOTING ORDINANCE DISCUSSION. 
Councilmember Pearce distributed a report and copies of three vehicle booting ordinance 
proposals. She reported the committee, comprised of USU studentbody leaders, an apartment 
manager, two apartment owners, and the manager of the local booting service, had met three 
times in the past three months. She said although little consensus was achieved through these 
meetings, they were useful in providing a forum for identifying and discussing vehicle booting 
issues and practices and attempting to negotiate acceptable solutions. The report identified five 
ways the situation could be improved: 
1. Educating University Students. Better dissemination of information regarding booting. Also, 
apartment owners should inform tenants in writing about parking lot regulations, including the use 
booting practices and fees. 
2. Costs. To address the issue of fluctuating charges by the booter, charges could be posted, 
publicized and applied in a fair, consistent manner. 
3. Cash requirement. The booter had required cash payment to remove boots from vehicles,a 
difficult requirement for students after banking hours and at night. Encouraging the booter to 
accept credit cards could alleviate this problem. 
4. Short-term parking. Encouraging apartment owners to have ten-minute loading zones in 
parking lots was suggested as one way to alleviate problems. 
The committee concluded that control should be based on education and information, 
individual responsibility, and fair and equitable application of any ordinance which was adopted. 
Chairman Pearce carefully reviewed the proposed City Code amendment to Section 
10.52.040, Regulation of impounding and booting practices. Police Lt. L. R. Earl addressed 
questions. 
Fees and vehicle booting signs in parking lots were discussed. It was agreed that 12x18 
inch signs were sufficient. No consensus was reached on minimum booting fees. Students 
supported $25; one ordinance proposed $40; the booter wanted $50 minimum. 
Karen Borg commented that all changes to the ordinance appeared to reflect what the 
booter, Brady Pierce wanted. It appeared to her that the student concern was mainly fees and to 
lower the minimum would be one concession to them. 
After -further discussion, it was decided to schedule the matter for the Council workshop 
agenda on February 2. Public comment on the vehicle booting ordinance would be accepted 
during the time allotted for discussion. 
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(#5) Logan Municipal Council Logan, Utah February 2,2000 
Vehicle Booting Ordinance discussion with public comment. 
Chairman Thompson opened the meeting to limited public comment on legislation 
regarding vehicle booting in private and public parking areas. 
Nate Anderson, ASUSU Studentbody President, reminded the Council that students had 
requested the ordinance reflect the following: (1) Requirement that the booter accept an 
alternative payment to cash; (2) posting of clearly visible signage regarding booting; (3) requiring 
printed receipts of the booter; (4) posted fee schedule, registered with the City. 
Brady Pierce said his company gave receipts. He objected to being required to accept 
checks and talked about problems with accepting credit cards. He was not opposed to having 
fees posted. In his opinion, his present fees were fair. Requiring $40 maximum fee would put him 
out of business, he said. Mr. Pierce did not think towing cars was a solution to congested 
apartment complex parking lots. He mentioned that he did not often resort to towing. 
Karen Borg's comment was that she hated the ordinance. 
Janice Pearce, Chair of the Review Committee said she would provide to Councilmembers 
booting fees from five cities. She said most charged $40, but towed many more vehicles. 
Randy Weston, large apartment complex owner, had contracted with Mr. Brady for 
booting services for the past five years. He said he had tried everything to manage parking, and 
booting was the best solution to discourage people from parking vehicles where they did not 
belong. He said there was no possibility of providing any visitor parking in his student apartment 
lots because parking was so limited, but temporary permits could be obtained from on-site 
managers. 
Chairman Thompson closed the public comment portion of the meeting. 
Councilmember Pearce asked Rich Hendricks for comments. The suggestion was made to 
allow vehicle owners a reasonable time to pay after the boot was placed on the vehicle prior to 
towing. Chief Hendricks pointed out that towing vehicles was not an alternative for either the 
Parking Authority or the Police Department. 
Nate Anderson restated the four hems he requested on behalf of the students. 
Alan Allred did not think the City could legislate the form of payment the booter would 
accept. 
Chairman Thompson thanked Janice Pearce for work on this issue and her report. The 
Council agreed to discuss the proposed legislation once more at a future meeting. 
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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. Booting Ordinance. Councilmember Pearce continues to work 
on an ordinance draft to bring to the Council. 
&H Logan Municipal Council Logan, Utah October 4,2000 
Vehicle booting ordinance. 
Chairman Pearce explained many months had been spent deliberating a motor vehicle 
booting ordinance. Chief Hendricks explained the changes to the ordinance. Booting, in general, 
was discussed. He spoke about the huge amount of unpaid parking fines some people 
accumulate. He said booting is just one tool to help remedy the situation and get people to pay 
their parking fines. 
Councilmember Borg questioned booting on private versus public property. Chief 
Hendricks said this concern is covered in other City ordinances. The proposed $40 fee was 
discussed. Mayor Thompson suggested a warning letter be part of the process. After further 
discussion, it was agreed to place the ordinance on the October 18 agenda for action. 
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Logan Municipal Council Logan, Utah October 18,2000 
Vehicle Booting Ordinance - Ordinance adopting regulations for motor vehicle 
impounding and booting practices in the City - 00-75 Revised, 
Chairman Pearce talked about the history of this long-discussed and debated ordinance 
and distributed past information. She gave the Council copies of booting rates from other cities 
in the State, as well as the current fee schedule of Cache Auto Booting. She said there were not 
many difference in the ordinance ^ efore them and the one received from the booting 
subcommittee which she-chaired. She pointed out Chief Hendricks had deleted a section 
requiring submission of information to the police department by a person booting motor vehicles. 
Councilmember Kerr thought the ordinance was confusing about where signs would be 
posted and suggested a change in wording, Councilmember Borg did not want any conflict with 
the sign ordinance. It was agreed that the ordinance should indicate signs would be placed "on 
the property." 
Discussion centered around sigaageand-notification-and what was-considered "sufficient 
information to assist vehicle owners in the prompt recovery of any vehicle booted." Chief 
Hendricks thought the hooter's phone number should be on the sign. Brady Pierce of Cache 
Auto Booting brought in a sign for the Council to see and discussed the practices of his company 
for notification after booting a vehicle. The Council agreed that a phone number should be 
included on the sign. Mr. Pierce had not seen the revised ordinance and did not know how it 
differed from the previous one. 
Councilmember Thompson asked about towing. Mr. Pierce said the towing fee allowed 
by State law is $80 per hour. Police Chief Hendricks talked about the formula established by 
State Statute putting this cap of $80 per hour on towing companies. Discussion then centered 
around the cost for booting. Chief Hendricks says towing is significantly more complicated and 
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cost prohibitive than booting. He discouraged the Council from trying to implement a per hour 
charge. Mr Pierce talked about his booting practice. The time element is in checking complexes 
and locating improperly parked cars. He confirmed that he gets paid only when he removes a 
boot. He talked about the income he brings in on a daily basis, which he said is not very much 
per day. His present rate is $50 for non-resident motorists. 
Slade Derr of ASUSU asked to present student interests. He says this is a big issue for 
students, particularly in four areas: (1) Need for temporary parking for short visits. He suggested 
a 15-minute mandatory time the booter would have to wait before booting the car. (2) Signs 
warning that booting will take place to be placed at the entrances to parking lots. (3) Low fee. 
They would like less but are comfortable with a $40-$50 level. (4) Booter to be required to take 
credit card and check payments. (Some students feel they are placed in a harmful situation at 
night if they have to go to ATM's to get cash for payment.) Mr. Derr said this is the top student 
priority request for amendment. 
There was discussion on forms of payment. The Council did not support telling a private 
business which form of payment it could take. As a compromise, Councilmember Borg 
supported disallowing any additional charge by the booter for leaving the booted car in the lot for 
up to 24 hours. The problems this would create were discussed. 
Mr. Derr asked that the Council take the student perspective into consideration. He 
thanked them for considering an ordinance that would put limitations on the booting practice. 
Chief Hendricks urged the Council to pass an ordinance that will facilitate more service 
providers. If this was done, then students could encourage apartment owners to make changes. 
Councilmember Borg suggested to Mr. Piqrce that he take credit cards and checks and the 
City would remove the cap on the fee. The problems this would create were discussed. 
Steve Bower said he did not like the booting ordinance. He talked about the contract for 
parking between the tenant and the property owner, which means to him that the tenant has also 
"leased" a parking space. Also, he did not think he should be "held hostage" for unpaid parking 
tickets after the ordinance is passed. 
Mr. Bower then clarified an earlier comment he made about Nevin Limburg not meeting 
with him. He said in the past Nevin had been "more than happy" to talk to him but had not 
responded to a request for information prior to this meeting. 
Brian Baer, a USU student, said he has been victim of booting. His opinion was that 
booting should be strongly regulated. He asked the Council to lower the fee and require the 
booter to accept all forms of payment. Also, he asked that signs in parking lots be reflective and 
posted on City property. 
Ryan Burleson said he is manager of an apartment complex and also a student. He 
supported booting and said it was successful in controlling parking in the complex. He thought 
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students should take personal responsibility for where they park. He asked that no cap be put on 
the fee for booting. 
Councilmember Kerr proposed a motion to amend the fee from $40 to $50 maximum, 
leaving other fees to the provider. It was decided to vote after all amendments had been agreed 
upon. Councilmember Kerr withdrew his motion. 
Potential additional fees were discussed. Chief Hendricks discouraged the Council from 
considering any additional fees regulating such things as abusive customers. Councilmember 
Borg proposed an amendment to section E(4): "The maximum authorized fee for booting a 
vehicle shall be $50 for up to either 36 or 48 hours." This was discussed. It was decided not to 
make this amendment. There was discussion about Mr. Pierce's fee schedule. The Council 
concurred on a maximum fee for booting of $50. The following amendments were agreed upon: 
1. D(l) " . . . Such signage will provide notice in large lettering with reflective background..." 
2. D(3)(a). "The City or its designee shall boot only on public property. 
3. D(3)(b). "Booting will take place, with written warning, after the fifth citation." 
4. E(4). "The maximum fee for booting a vehicle shall be $50.00 for up to 24 hours." 
Chief Hendricks suggested removing "up to 24 hours." from amendment 4. After 
discussion, the Council agreed. It was also agreed that other problems dealing with booting, such 
as damages, are separate issues, and the booter will have to make the decision whether or not to 
pursue through the court system. 
ACTION. Motion by Councilmember Borg, seconded by Councilmember Kerr to adopt 
Ord. 00-75 as amended above. Motion carried 4-1, S. Thompson voting no. 
Karen S. Borg, voted yes 
Tom Kerr, voted yes 
Janice Pearce, voted yes 
Alan D. Alfred, voted yes 
Stephen C. Thompson, voted no 
Logan Municipal Council Logan, Utah November 15, 2000 
Review of finalized language for Ord. 00-75, Vehicle Booting. 
City Attorney Mark Sorenson reviewed changes in language to the Booting Ordinance 
which had been adopted October 18. The changes had been made by Police Chief Hendricks to 
clarify Council intent. Since the ordinance had been published, Attorney Sorenson wanted to 
review the changes with the Council and have the ordinance republished. Section F was added 
requiring landlords who engage a private parking enforcement company to boot illegally parked 
vehicles on their property to inform their tenants and make instructions available on how to 
comolv with the law. 
After discussion, the Council agreed to the changes. There was also consensus to 
remove the requirement that the parking enforcement company provide its address on the notice 
affixed to the booted vehicle. Name, telephone number and fee amount are required to be placed 
on the notice. 
ACTION. Motion by Councilmember Alfred, seconded by Councilmember Kerr to 
adopt Ordinance 00-75 Revised 11/15/00. Motion carried unanimously. 
Karen S. Borg, voted yes 
Tom Kerr, voted yes 
Janice Pearce, chair, did not vote 
AlanD. Alfred, voted yes 
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Chris Daines, Bar # 0800 ° 
David R. Daines, Bar # 0801 
CHRIS DAINES LAW 
135 North Main, Suite 108 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Phone: (435)752-1750 Fax: 753-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
QUINN MILLET, AFFIDAVIT OF QUINN MILLET 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 040101921 
LOGAN CITY, DS BRIDGERLAND Judge Gordon J. Low 
APARTMENTS, INC., and CACHE AUTO 
BOOTING SERVICE, 
Defendants. 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
County of Cache) 
QUINN MILLET, the Plaintiff in the above action, being first duly sworn on oath 
deposes and says: 
1. That on the 10th day of September, 2003, my car was booted by Defendant, Cache 
Auto Booting Service ("Booter"), while parked in the parking lot of the Bridgerland Apartments, 
owned by Defendant Ds Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. located in Logan City, Utah. 
2. The Booter demanded a payment of FIFTY DOLLARS ($50.00) in cash for the 
release of the boot. I paid the FIFTY DOLLARS ($50.00) in cash as demanded. In return, the 
Booter provided me an unsigned written memo acknowledging my payment called a "Receipt", a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit A, and released the boot. 
to 
1*1 
3. I wrote a demand for the return of my FIFTY DOLLARS ($50.00) on the grounds 
that the booting was unconstitutional. A copy of that demand is attached as Exhibit B. 
4. The Booter sent me the letter dated March 13, 2004, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit C, together with a copy of the Logan City Booting Ordinance enclosed, explaining why 
he considered his booting me to be legal and constitutional. 
DATED March2£, 2005. 
Quinn Millet 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on March2#, 2005. 
HOLLYA.HAUETER 
NOTARY PUBUC-STATE Of UTAH 
135 H MAW SITOEJ SUOT JOB 
LOGAN UTW321 
My Comm. Exp. (S/1Q/200& <ZLU2M<LJ 
/SD 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On March 2h, 2005,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing to: 
Miles P. Jensen 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
88 West Center 
Logan, UT 84321 
Kevin J. Fife 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
88 West Center 
Logan, UT 84321 
David L. Church 
BLAISDELL & CHURCH 
5995 South Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
Kymber Housley 
Logan City Attorney 
255 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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Quinn Millet 
954 North 600 East #21 
Logan, UT 84321 
March 2nd , 2004 
Ronald & Hollie Liechty 
Cache Auto Booting Services 
175 East Center Street 
Providence, UT 84332 
James B. Anderson 
D's Bridgerland Apartments 
3276 South 250 West 
Nibley,UT 84321 
James B. Anderson 
D's Bridgerland Apartments 
76 West 2400 North, Box 3448 
Logan, UT 84343 
Dear Cache Auto Booting Service and D's Bridgerland Apartments: 
My name is Quinn Millet. I am a resident at D's Bridgerland Apartments and my 
car was "booted" on 9/10/03. I have thought/researched the actions that you have taken 
towards me and I have even gone to the point of reading the ordinance pertaining to 
booting. Now, even more than before, I feel that you violated my right to due process 
and my rights (4th amendment/ 14th amendment) by the unreasonable seizure of my car 
and the taking of my fifty dollars. I would like to be reimbursed for the money taken 
from me ($ 50.00). I am also asking that you discontinue this illegal / blatant / 
inflammatory violation of civil rights by discontinuing your "booting" activities 
altogether and indefinitely. If you fail to pay me this money (that you have illegally 
taken from me and fail to make a written promise to discontinue "booting") I will take 
legal action against you. I expect a written response within 7 days. If I don't receive a 
written response I will assume that you fully agree with my position and that my fifty 
dollars is forthcoming. Please send both items to the above address. 
' D ' 
Sincere! 
uinn Millet 
/S3 
Cache Auto Booting S u f ^ 
Services 
March 13,2004 
Mr. Quinn Miflet 
954 North 600 East #21 
Logan, UT 84321 
Dear Sin 
In response to your letter dated March 2, 2004, I Ron Liechty, President of Cache Auto Booting 
Services wish to inform you of the following facts: 
1. Booting practices are completely legal as defined by Logan City Ordinance 10.52.040. See 
attached copy of ordinance. 
2. We have a valid license in Logan City to do business. 
3. We have a contract with D's Bridgerland Apartments to patrol and enforce parking in their 
parking lot. 
4. Your reference to your "civil rights" do not apply to what you do on someone elses' private 
property. It is the property owners' right to protect their property. This includes enforcement of 
parking rules. 
As the date you referred to was over 5 months ago, it is difficult to re-create what exactly happened. If 
you could produce a receipt from our company we may be able to better determine what the facts are. 
The receipt will have the License plate # of the booted vehicle as well as the date the fine was 
collected. As a practice these receipts are given to evetyone paying a boot fine. We also need to see 
a copy of your residential contract and the vehicle registration. 
Sincerely, 
Ronald S. Liechty 
President - Cache Auto Booting Service 
EtHtetT c 
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10.52.040 Regulation Of Impounding And Booting Practices: 
A. Authorization To Impound Vehicles: Every police officer of the city is authorized summarily 
to seize and take possession of every abandoned or illegally parked or operated vehicle, 
which is declared to be an obstruction to traffic and a nuisance, wherever found, by 
removing or causing such vehicle to be removed and impounded in any authorized vehicle 
pound. Every police officer of the city is also further authorized to seize and take 
possession of any vehicle which is being operated upon the public streets of the city with 
improper registration, or which the officer has good reason to believe has been stolen, or 
on which any motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark has been 
defaced, altered or obliterated, and to remove or cause such vehicle to be removed and 
impounded in any authorized vehicle pound. Every police officer so impounding a vehicle 
shall within twenty four (24) hours make a written report thereof to the chief of police 
specifying the manufacturer's trade name and model of the impounded vehicle, its license 
and motor number, if available, the time and place where the vehicle was taken and 
impounded, and the cause of the impounding. 
B. Definition: I!Bootiag-n^means to place any immobilization device upon a motor vehicle not 
registered to the person placing the immobilization device for purposes of parking 
enforcement. 
C. Exceptions: This section shall not apply to any parking regulations as established by a 
college or university pursuant to title 53B, chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated. 
D. Booting Of Vehicles: It shall be unlawful for any property owner or designee to boot any 
motor vehicle that is trespassing or infringing upon the real property rights of that property 
owner without complying with this section. 
1. Private parking lots which contain four (4) or more parking spaces and which use booting 
of vehicles for parking enforcement shall post a conspicuous sign on the landlord's 
property. Such sign will provide notice, with reflective background, that unauthorized 
vehicles will be booted. At a minimum, signage shall: 
a. Provide sufficient information to assist vehicle owners in the prompt recovery of any 
vehicle booted; 
b. Be at least twelve inches by eighteen inches (12" x 18") in size. 
2. After a boot is placed on any vehicle, the parking enforcement company shall: 
a. Provide a notice affixed to the boot or vehicle containing the name and telephone 
number of the firm that placed the boot on the vehicle, as well as the amount of the fee 
required to remove the boot; 
b. Maintain personnel authorized to remove any boot and release any vehicle to its 
owner or driver upon the payment of any authorized fee except as provided in subsection 
D3 of this section; 
c. Once payment is made, provide a receipt upon request of individual making payment 
for removal of the boot. 
http://66.113.195.234/UT/Logan/l 1013000000004000.htm 3/11/2004 
JST 
I W . ^ ^ . V / • VT X V V ^ V * 4 M H V X A V ^ A XXXAJpVH^J.i.VJ.AXX^> J. KXXVi. JU» WV*f UJULlg X l C I V ^ l l V ^ O . X~<1££C . Z O I . } 
3. The city of Logan or its designee may leave a boot in place until payment of parking fines 
issued pursuant to section 10.52.290 of this chapter are satisfied. 
a. The city of Logan or its designee may only attach a boot in accordance with this 
section on public property. 
b. Vehicles may only be booted by the city of Logan or its designee following five (5) 
written citations and a written notice for the violations. 
E. License Requirements; Fees: Any parking enforcement company desiring to boot vehicles 
within Logan City shall: 
Obtain a business license in the city of Logan; and register its business name, telephone 
number, either an address or a PO box number, and fee schedules with Logan City. In the 
event of a change in business name, telephone number, address or PO box number, or fee 
schedules, such company shall register such information with the Logan City business 
license department within ten (10) days. 
1. Failure to comply with any provision of this section shall constitute grounds for 
suspension or revocation of the business license of any company licensed under this 
section to conduct parking enforcement service in Logan City. 
2. A parking enforcement company shall not charge a fee in excess of any fee listed in the 
fee schedule for booting a vehicle. 
3. A parking enforcement company shall not charge any fee related to the booting of a 
vehicle that is not listed in the fee schedule. 
4. The maximum authorized fee for booting a vehicle shall be fifty dollars ($50.00) for up to 
twenty four (24) hours. 
5. Charges for damages to booting equipment shall not be governed by this section and 
shall not prevent the vehicle's release if scheduled fees are satisfied. 
F. Private Parking Enforcement: Landlords who engage a private parking enforcement 
company to boot illegally parked vehicles on their property shall inform their tenants of the 
booting practice and make available instructions on how to comply with the law. 
1. A parking permit shall be provided to each tenant with instructions as to where that 
permit should be displayed in the automobile; 
2. Tenants shall be provided with a written schedule of fees charged by the parking 
enforcement company; 
3. Tenants shall be provided with instructions regarding visitor parking or will be informed if 
no visitor parking is available; 
4. Tenants shall be provided with a method for replacing a lost permit; landlords/managers 
may charge a fee for such replacement; the replacement fee must be made known to 
tenants at the time they receive their parking permits. 
http://66.113.195.234/UT/Logan/l 1013000000004000.htm 3/11/2004 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
QUINN MILLET, * 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * Case No. 040101921 
LOGAN CITY, D'S BRIDGERLAND * 
APARTMENTS, INC., and CACHE 
AUTO BOOTING SERVICE, * Judge: Gordon J. Low 
Defendants. * 
THE ABOVE MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to three motions, (1) the 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (2) Defendants D's Bridgerland Apartments, 
Inc. and Cache Auto Booting Service's Motion to Dismiss, and (3) Defendant Logan City's 
Motion to Dismiss. Following Plaintiffs Complaint and Defendant Logan City's Answer, 
Defendants' D's Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. and Cache Auto Booting Service's filed its 
Motion to Dismiss and a supporting memorandum. Plaintiff responded by memorandum in 
opposition and Defendants' D's Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. and Cache Auto Booting Service's 
filed a reply memorandum. The Court originally heard oral arguments on January 28, 2005, in 
regards to Defendants D's Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. and Cache Auto Booting Service's 
Motion to Dismiss and the parties stipulated to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to file a motion for 
summary judgment and supporting memorandum, adjusting the procedural motions to allow 
Defendant Logan City the ability to address the merits of Plaintiff s claim as it pertains to Logan 
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City's Ordinance No. 2000-75 (the "Ordinance"). The parties then were allowed permissible 
time to respond and additional oral arguments were held May 18, 2005, following a full briefing 
of the issues by the parties. In preparation of its decision, the Court has reviewed each motion, 
memoranda, document, affidavit, the relevant case law, and applicable statutory provisions. 
Background 
The following germane facts are undisputed. The Plaintiff entered a lease agreement (the 
"Lease") with Defendant D's Bridgerland Apartments (the "Landlord") on August 22, 2003. 
Then, on September 10, 2003, Defendant Cache Auto Booting Service (the "Booter") 
immobilized Plaintiff vehicle's by booting. The Booter has an ongoing contract with the 
Landlord to enforce the Landlord's parking lot restrictions. The Plaintiff paid a $50.00 fee to 
have his vehicle released from the boot and filed this claim, alleging the Ordinance 
unconstitutionally violated his Due Process Rights under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution and in violation of 42 
U.S.C.A. 1983. 
Arguments 
The Complaint initially asserts that the creation of the Ordinance constituted a surrender 
or abdication of the Defendant Logan City's (hereafter, the "City") control over its police power 
regarding the seizure of vehicles because the Ordinance grants to private businesses and licensed 
booters the power to initiate each seizure without a procedural due process safeguard, a pre-
deprivation hearing by a neutral official The Complaint references Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67 (1972) and its selected progeny, namely, Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Sutton v. 
City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2nd 644 (CA Wise. 1982, Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932 F.2nd 
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1171 (111. 1991), Gillam v. Landrieu, 455 F.Supp. 1030 (D.C. La. 1978), Patterson v. Cronin, 
650 P.2d 531 (Colo. 1982), Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So.2d 891 (La. 1985), and 
Haefner v. APCOA Parking Inc. et. al, 500 N.Y.S. 2d 605 (N.Y. 1986), openly acknowledging 
the deprivation of personal property by towing is synonymous to booting. Of particular concern 
to the Plaintiff is the potential for abusive parking enforcement by private, licensed booting 
companies seeking a profit. 
The Plaintiffs Complaint also states constitutional issues. To Plaintiff, the Ordinance is 
unconstitutionally problematic in that it is arbitrary, capricious and an irrational due process 
denial because it allows landlords the ability to issue numerous parking permits, exceeding their 
numbered tenant parking spaces. Plaintiff argues the Ordinance unjustly allows landlords or their 
booters the ability to boot short term drop-off situations absent any enforcement records, so long 
as a nondescript receipt, without the hooter's address, is given. Further, Plaintiff professes the 
Ordinance is vague in that it requires a sign as notice of potential booting in landlord/tenant 
situations but is unclear on other projected property owners with four or more parking stalls. 
Plaintiff asserts that at common law, the tenant's right to a leased parking stall affords him and 
not the Landlord a self-help remedy because the actions taken against the Plaintiff constitute a 
special injury, by way of an analogy, similar to an extortion or an illegal lien. Lastly, Plaintiff 
argues the Ordinance exceeds local government constitutional limitations. 
Asserting the Complaint is improper, the Landlord and Booter claims together in their 
Motion to Dismiss, that no state action occurred to trigger 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, because only 
private parties are involved. The Defendants then references Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 
U.S. 922, 939 (1982) and Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) to support the claim that the 
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complaint fails to state an action upon which relief can be granted because the action by a private 
party pursuant to a law is "not sufficient to justify a characterization of that party as a 'state 
actor."' Defendants states that the grounds for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction is not established because no irreparable harm is found, the balancing of interest 
weighs in favor of the private landlord and booter, and public interest supports the practice of 
private landlords enforcing their parking lots. Lastly, the Defendants Landlord and Booter assert, 
even if they are found to be defacto state actors, the applicable statute of limitation, U.C.A. §78-
12-29 excludes both the Landlord and Booter from liability when Plaintiff failed to file within 
one year from the injury. 
Retorting, the Plaintiff presents the argument that the Ordinance is unconstitutional 
because a "special injury" is seen in this case. The Plaintiff also professes that Lugar and Wyatt 
support the premise that an action under the color of state law is equivalent to a state action under 
42 U.S.C.A. §1983. According to Plaintiff, the Landlord and Booter are acting under the color of 
state law because the Ordinance abdicates by regulation the enforcement of landlord/tenant 
parking lots. Plaintiff contends it is the victim which lacks a complete remedy at law because he 
is deprived of personal property, without any possibility to inject a plausible defense by a private 
booter who does not even have to identify themselves or their company/business license, unlike 
the university booting policies. Because Plaintiff is student and continually subject to the 
practice of various landlord booting, Plaintiff believes an injunction is needed. 
In reply, Defendant Landlord and Defendant Booter assert the booting of Plaintiff s 
vehicle did not constitute a state action because it was conducted by purely private parties. The 
Defendants suggest that Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 
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U.S. 600 (1974) correctly characterized Fuentes as now requiring notice and hearing only when 
an adversary procedure was not available and a state official is jointly acting along with the 
private party. The Landlord and Booter also allege distinguishable factors in Fuentes and Lugar 
from the Plaintiffs booting situation, stating in the replevin cases the state action was evidenced 
by an ex parte petition, a court's issuance of a writ and the executive branch's execution of the 
writ. To Defendants Landlord and Booter, the mere reliance on the ordinance is insufficient to 
find their private enforcement of the apartment parking lot arising to state action, referencing 
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), Shipley v. First Fed. S&LAss 'n ofDe., 703 F. 
Supp. 1122 (D.Del. 1998), and Weinrich v. Park City, 751 F.2d 357 (10 Cir. 1984). 
Plaintiff then reiterates several of its arguments based upon Fuentes in its Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Applying Fuentes, Plaintiff asserts that two key due process 
elements are absent, namely the seizure of personal property must be initiated by a government 
official and that the seizure must be accompanied by adequate notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing in a timely fashion. Plaintiff, citing Haefner and Wilson, suggest the first element is 
important because the state must keep strict control over its monopoly on legitimate force and 
citizens must resort to the judicial process rather than having all private citizens settle their 
disputes privately. To Plaintiff, the common law right of self-help abatement rests with the 
specially injured tenant who cannot find a lessee parking space and is now subject to a fine and 
not allowed an opportunity to a hearing prior to the deprivation of his vehicle. 
The Plaintiff affirms that the Landlord's and Booter's actions are an illegal lien, which 
are outside the expressed authority of the City to create under Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. To support this premise that private booting equates to an illegal lien, Plaintiff 
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references 39 Am Jur. 2d Highways, Streets, and Bridges §349, §353, §358 and §369, Irvine v. 
Wood, 51 NY 224 (NY Ct. App. 1872). Plaintiff argues that as an illegal lien, the Ordinance's 
regulation of private booting violates the common law of self help of those specially injured, 
relying on Lewis v. Pingree Nat. Bank, 151 P. 558 (Utah 1915) (holding a special injury was 
found in a private nuisance abatement of a street obstruction). Lastly, Plaintiff professes that 
based on Hansen v. Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 691 (Utah 1968) and certain dictum in Keller v. 
Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, the creation of an ordinance, in conflict 
with the general law (i.e. the common law right to self help during a special injury) violates the 
U.S. Constitution and Utah State Due Process clauses. 
Responding, the City submits that the Plaintiff lacks standing to raise its constitutional 
claims. Citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Utah 1983), the City implies that the 
Plaintiff has not "suffered a distinct and palpable injury sufficient that gives him a personal stake 
in the outcome of the legal dispute." See also Council ofHolladay City v. Larkin, 89 P.3d 164 
(Utah 2004). The City alleges that while the Plaintiff was booted, the ordinance regulates the 
Landlord's common law right to self help or boot and that the Landlord's compliance with the 
regulation in no way creates an injury for the Landlord's otherwise valid actions. Moreover, the 
City states that the booting of Plaintiff did not involve any state action or create an action under 
the color of state law because the Ordinance does not authorize or require private booting, 
encourage or require the City to assist private landlords regulate their own parking lots though 
booting. 
The City also responded to the Plaintiffs constitutional concerns. To the City, the 
Ordinance meets the Due Process requirements, which articulated in Goichman v. City of Aspen, 
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859 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1988) and Weinrauch, do not require a pre-deprivation hearing prior to 
the impounding and towing of a vehicle under 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 actions because the payment 
of a towing fee is equivalent to a bond, so long as a post-deprivation hearing is allowed 
addressing the merits of the vehicles parking violation. The City also relies upon City of Los 
Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003), stating the standards of Due Process in towing 
situations require a review of three factors, (1) the level of private interest affected by the official 
action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation in light of the value of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards, and (3) the governmental interests involved (paraphrased). Applying 
these factors, the City argues the up-front payment of a booting fee and temporary disablement of 
Plaintiff car is not enough under City of Los Angeles. Also, the City states the opportunity to 
dispute a parking fee exists in traffic court or small claims court, those alleviate any erroneous 
deprivation concerns. And third, the City states the creation of a expeditious, pre-deprivation 
hearing would be an "administrative nightmare." To the other constitutional issues, the City 
argues the Ordinance does not prohibit otherwise legal booting, as it was legitimately crafted 
under the City's business license powers under U.C.A. §10-1-203 and its general welfare powers 
found in U.C.A. §10-8-84. 
The Defendants Landlord and Booter also submitted a reply to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Promoting the same arguments as the City and those found in their 
previous memoranda, the Landlord and Booter state the Plaintiff lacks standing because no 
action has been taken by the City pursuant to the Ordinance. Moreover, these Defendants cite 
Rienertsen v. Porter, 242 Ga. 624 (Ga. 1978), Forest Hills Garden Corp. v. Kowler, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y. App. 1981), and Forest Hills Gardens Corp. v. Baroth, 555 N.Y.S.2d 1000 
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(N.Y. 1990), to support the conceded principle that a common law right exists to enforce private 
party parking restrictions. The Landlord and Booter then asserts the Plaintiffs reliance on 
Fuentes' progeny is misplaced because several towing regulations have been reviewed for Due 
Process and 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 concerns and found the valid exercise of private parties outside 
any color of state law. Specifically, the defendants reference Hinman v. Lincoln Towing Service, 
Inc., Ill F.2d 189,193 (7th Cir. 1985), which held a private actor, regulating private property 
parking enforcement, was not encouraged or supported by an Illinois regulatory statute regulating 
the imposition of a towing lien, because Illinois property owners, "long had the right to remove 
by towing any unauthorized vehicles at the owner's expense." Lastly, Defendants Landlord and 
Booter distinguishes Haefner and Wilson from the booting of Plaintiff s vehicle by asserting the 
key distinctions in Wilson and Haefner was the presence of government initiators or actual 
detainers, in Wilson city officials placed the boot {Wilson) and in Haefner county airport 
employees instigated the towing. 
The Plaintiff next responds to the City's argument, by asserting the fine of $50 for the 
boot and the temporary loss of personal property establishes an injury under the standing 
requirements needed to raise the issue of the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Plaintiff 
concedes that a pre-deprivation notice and hearing are not required under the Due Process 
Fuentes progeny throughout the Federal Court of Appeals. However, Plaintiff still professes the 
failure of the Ordinance to require a timely, post-seizure hearing and argues the surrendering of 
the City's police power to regulate private parking creates constitutional due process defects in 
the Ordinance. Additionally, the Plaintiff states the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and 
improperly preempts three valid general law areas, (1) self-help nuisance abatement remedies, (2) 
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police power over quasi-public parking lots, and (3) the imposition of criminal liability to 
specially injured persons exercising self-help. Such preemption into 'general law' invalidates the 
Ordinance under the Plaintiffs interpretation ofHansen. 
The City replies with only two new arguments. First, the City contends that Plaintiff has 
not overcome the presumption of constitutionality required by legislative enactments, pursuant to 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 815 (Utah 1991) because no section of the 
Ordinance is adequately demonstrated as vague and arbitrary enforcement does not threaten an 
otherwise valid regulation. Second, the City argues Plaintiffs rationale regarding Hansen's 
effect on a legislative act which arguably preempts certain common law rights is illogical and 
improper because 'general law' is not equivalent to 'common law' and the City has broad 
authority to pass the Ordinance under State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980). 
Finally, in reply, Plaintiff asserts that standing must be extended to those being fined 
pursuant to a Ordinance and that the affect of the Ordinance is significant in that it crosses the 
line of permissible regulation. To Plaintiff, the City surrenders its police power and allows 
illegal prejudgment garnishments by a private party exercising authority under the guise of the 
Ordinance, absent due process protections, similarly ruled upon in Hatfield v. Williams, 64 
F.R.D. 71 (N.D. Iowa 1974), Stuckers v. Thomas, 374 F. Supp. 178 (DCSD 1974), Fieldston 
Property Owners' Ass 'n v. City of New York, 266 NYS 2d 97 (NY 1965), and J & M Parking 
Management, Inc. v. City of New York, 1998 WestLaw 74303 (SDNY Fed. 1998) and discussed 
in 32 ALR Fed 43 land 32 ALR 4th 728. The Plaintiff believes that the Ordinance could have 
regulated the cost of booting only, but by licensing booting companies and the imposing 
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regulations on landlord/tenant parking lots, the City must now create an administrative hearing 
remedy in order to counter-balance the removal of the tenant's ability to instigate self-help. 
Discussion 
Apparent in the above, the parties have exhaustively argued the practice of booting 
through a barrage of arguments, using holdings, dicta, and analogies from various case law 
involving creditor/debtor, landlord/tenant, state/citizen involved from replevin actions to booting 
and towing situations. The emotionally charged issues of booting, parking enforcement, private 
landlord rights, and tenant rights are not absent constitutional direction, despite the length of the 
arguments and the contradicting portrayal of case law by the parties. The issues surrounding the 
Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 cause of action and various constitutional challenges to the 
Ordinance can be divided distinctly into four central issues. First, does the Plaintiff have 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Ordinance? Second, do the actions of the 
Landlord and/or Booter constitute actions under the color of state law, and if so, does the City 
and its Ordinance's failure to ensure an expeditious, administrative hearing violate the Due 
Process clauses of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah State Constitution? Third, does the City have the authority to draft the Ordinance? And 
fourth, is the Ordinance unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary? Each issue will be addressed in 
turn. 
Standing 
Each of the Defendants in part challenge the standing of the Plaintiff, asserting that the 
temporary deprivation of Plaintiff s personal property and the imposition of a $50 fee does not 
give the Plaintiff a personal stake in the legal outcome of the case, or that the injury is deminis at 
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best. The Plaintiff responds by reasserting its original position that the actions of the Landlord 
and Booter are directly adverse to the Plaintiff and are performed under the mantle of an illegal 
ordinance. The Utah Supreme Court has recently held, that in order to have standing, "a party 
must allege that he or she has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury that is fairly traceable 
to the conduct at issue such that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury." Provo City 
Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14 Tf9, 86 P.3d 735. The party may not, however, "raise the claims 
of any third party who are not before the court." Id. Present in the current case is the allegation 
that Plaintiffs common law right to self help has been eviscerated by the passage of the 
Ordinance and that the actions of the Landlord and Booter constituted a color of state law 
situation. These and other arguments against the Ordinance and the Landlord and Booters 
actions are directly traceable to the Plaintiffs injury, which can be qualified as the temporary 
deprivation of his vehicle, the cost of paying the booting fee, and the time involved to seek a 
redress.1 
Civil Action Statute 42 U.S.C. §1983 
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation ..., of any 
State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress,... injunctive relief shall not be granted unless 
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
1
 Additionally, the Plaintiff has a right to challenge the constitutionality of the Ordinance 
under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution, which states "all courts must be open 
and every person is entitled to a remedy by due course of law fir injury doen to him or her or to 
his or her property or reputation. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
11 
2/7 
The Supreme Court has held that in actions asserting a violation of §1983, "the plaintiff must 
allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and ... he must allege that the person 
who has deprived him of that right acted under a color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Massey v. OgdenArea Comm. Action Committee, Inc., 86 
P.3d 120, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). A color of state law action is seen if (1) the actor performs 
a function "normally exercised by the state," (2) the actor is coerced or encouraged by the state, 
or (3) there is a close nexus between the actor and the state. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 543-546 (1987) (paraphrased in part). Any 
person who acts under color of state law to cause the deprivation of rights, privileges or 
immunities of another individual is liable to the injured party in an action at law, regardless of 
the intent of the party is deprive the individual or not. Monroe v. Pape, 365 US 167 (1961). Yet 
under Adickes v. S.K Kress & Co., 398 US 144 (1970), the complainant must show the violating 
party acted with knowledge of and pursuant to the statute being challenged. The mere reference 
to the Ordinance or adherence to the Ordinance will not create a color of state law action per se. 
Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc, 372 F. Supp. 594, 597 (E.D. Mich. 1974) 
(holding "state action does not necessarily result whenever a state renders any sort of benefit or 
service to a private entity or seeks to regulate private activity in any degree whatever."); see also 
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), (holding a state's warehouseman's lien statute 
did not trigger a 1983 cause of action because the state did not compel the sale of the plaintiffs 
possessions but merely announced the circumstances under which its courts would not interfere 
with a private sale). 
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Here, the Landlord and Booter both referenced the Ordinance by letter or indirectly with 
the parking lot sign, suggesting that they acknowledge their actions were performed with a 
knowledge of the Ordinance and arguably in conformity with the statute. However, the Landlord 
states that his actions were not pursuant to the Ordinance but rather his common law to boot or 
tow unwanted cars from his private property and that his right extends to his contracted agent, the 
Booter. While the Plaintiff concedes the Landlord held a common law right to enforce the 
parking on the Landlord's parking lot, the Plaintiff professes the Ordinance and subsequent 
actions of the Landlord and Booter are sufficiently under the Ordinance to triggered a §1983 
color of state law scenario. 
The Plaintiff holds that the Ordinance abdicates the City's police power over the 
enforcement of quasi-public parking, implying the Landlord's apartment parking lot qualifies as 
quasi-public. However, this position is not supported. Under U.C.A. §41-6a-214(l), a "quasi-
public ... parking area means a privately owned and maintained ... parking area that is generally 
held open for use of the public for purposes of *.. parking." Based upon the language in the 
Lease, retaining by contract the Landlord's right to enforce the parking within the parking lot, 
and the Landlord's sign outside the Landlord's parking lot notifying the public to the parking 
lot's enforcement by booting (as required by the Ordinance), the Landlord clearly demonstrated 
the parking lot's private property status. The mere presence of visitor parking does not change 
the status of the Landlord's parking lot to quasi-public because it is not continually held open to 
the public but rather to 'visitors' of the Landlord's tenants. Moreover, the Plaintiff does not 
argue any other usurpation by the Ordinance of police power over private parking enforcement 
nor does the Plaintiff present any evidence that the city typically exercises its police powers in 
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similar landlord/tenant parking lots. Thus, the Landlord and/or Booter is not exercising a normal 
state function. 
The Plaintiff holds the licensing requirements, expressed through the Ordinance, creates a 
nexus with the state, however, this argument is both weak and unpersuasive. The Supreme Court 
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 US 830, 842 (1982) held that a private school's decision to 
discharge certain employees did not constitute an act under color of state law, even though the 
school was regulated by state law, depended upon government contracts, and was supported by 
public funds because the decision to discharge was not compelled or even influenced by any state 
regulation and there was no "symbiotic relationship" between the school and the state. Similarly, 
the mere presence of a licensing system and minor regulatory requirements does not create a 
nexus with any state action. By contrast, the obvious entanglement of the state in its public 
universities creates a sufficient nexus requiring the local university to implement additional due 
process safeguards not required of private actors. 
Next, reviewing whether the City, through th£ Ordinance, encourages the Landlord and 
Booter to deprive the Plaintiff of personal property without due process, the Court notes the 
Ordinance is absent any expressed authorization language granting licensed booting companies 
the ability to initiate booting outside of the Landlord's common law right. Nonetheless, the 
Plaintiff asserts the Ordinance encourages the Landlord and Booter because it allows landlords, 
acting through certain licensed booters, to cloak their actions under the auspice of the state and 
purposely disregard the rights of certain tenants (those parking in lots with four or more spaces). 
It is here where parties diverge radically in interpreting the case law. The Plaintiff professes that 
the dicta from Fuentes, Lugar, Mitchell, Wyatt and its relative progeny, extending these cases to 
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various booting/towing cases, namely Saukstelis, Wilson, Sutton, Haefner, Patterson, and Gillam, 
asserting a color of state law action is seen because Plaintiffs common law right to self help 
following a special injury is completely removed by the City's passing of the Ordinance. To 
Plaintiff, the Ordinance illegally allows booters to seize vehicles, synonymous to the City 
crafting an ordinance allowing a private party to extort an illegal lien. Responding, the 
Defendants asserts alternative approaches to the case law, professing that the involvement of 
state actors in Plaintiffs various case law is clearly distinguishable from Landlord's decision to 
boot Plaintiffs car in that there is no state involvement and the Ordinance merely regulates the 
Landlord's common law rights. To Defendants, the booting of Plaintiff s vehicle is similar to a 
bond required prior to post-deprivation hearings, relying on City of Los Angeles, Goichman and 
Weinrauch. The Court is persuaded with the latter approach for a number of reasons. 
First, the Plaintiff has not sufficiently established that he held a common law right to self 
help without establishing the presence of a public or private nuisance because the Plaintiff is 
potentially no more specially injured in this case than the Landlord. Under the only cited case 
used to establish the Plaintiffs self-help remedy right, Lewis v. Pingree, 151 P. 558, 561 (Utah 
1915), the Court held that private person may not invoke the aid of the courts to abate a public 
nuisance, unless they can show that they suffer some special or peculiar injury or damage which 
is not common to the rest of the community. See also Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144, 148 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding claimant must show damages were suffered different those of the 
society at large, seen with a physical injury); Solar Salt Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 555 
P.2d 286, 289 (Utah 1976). In Plaintiffs case, while booting may invoke a negative response to 
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the operator of the restrained vehicle, it hardly qualifies as a public nuisance unique to the 
Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiffs reference to Irvine v. Wood, 51 NY 224 (NY Ct. App. 1872), a unique 
private nuisance case, is likewise improper because in that case the landlord and tenant had 
adequate notice of hazardous sidewalk and both failed to take action, causing the tenant to suffer 
physically injuries. Under Utah's private nuisance case law, the claimant must show 
"unreasonable conduct." Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing 
People v. Burtlesen, 47 P.87, 89 (1986) and W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the 
Law of Torts §§ 88 & 90 (5th ed. 1984)). Here, the Plaintiff fails to show the Landlord's or 
Booter's conduct was unreasonable or that he made any attempt to contact the Landlord to 
provide any notice of a various parking enforcement concern until after Plaintiffs vehicle was 
booted. While it is arguably an inconvenience to not find a permitted parking space adjacent to 
the Landlord's apartment building and consequently pay fees to remove a boot placed on an 
allegedly, improperly parked car, this is in no way qualifies as a special injury stemming from a 
private nuisance. The Landlord's potential injuries arising from improper tenant and non-tenant 
parking must also be considered. One vehicle in an unpermitted parking space may appear 
trivial, however, the effects are felt by other tenants who consequently complain to the Landlord, 
causing additional exerted energy and time to remove the trespassing vehicle by the Landlord 
and/or his employees or agents. 
Second, the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Ordinance encourages the Landlord and 
Booters action because the parties openly contracted that the Landlord held the reserve the right 
to regulate parking. Nowhere in the contract did the Landlord transfer any right to park in a 
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selected space or guaranteed the existence of a space in the regular parking. Section 12 of the 
Lease specifically reads; 
Tenant shall use only that parking space designated for use, and the Tenant shall 
see to it that Tenant's guests use only the parking space provided for guest 
parking. Use of parking other than as permitted, will not be allowed and the 
vehicle in violation may be towed or disabled at Tenant's expense. 
While the Plaintiff maintains that a regular parking space is implied in the Lease, such an 
inference is inappropriate when read in conjunction with other provisions of the Lease limiting 
the Landlord's liability. For example, Section 8 states; 
Interruption or failure of any service maintained in the building in which the 
apartment is located, if due to causes beyond Landlord's control, shall not entitle 
Tenant to any claim against Landlord or to any reduction in rent,... unless 
Landlord shall fail to take such measures as may be reasonable in the 
circumstances to restore the service without undue delay. 
While Section 8 does not expressly address services outside the building, it is rational to assume 
the same standard of reasonableness should apply. Simply put, the Landlord's booting practices 
appears to be a viable way to ensure the Plaintiff is given a parking space without causing the 
drivers of wrongfully parked vehicles to go to an isolated storage facility to retrieve towed 
property. 
Third, the Plaintiffs reliance on certain creditor/debtors case law (i.e. Fuentes, Lugar, 
Mitchell and Wyatt) and certain selected booting/towing cases (i.e. Saukstelis, Wilson, Sutton, 
Haefner, Patterson, and Gillam,) is unpersuasive because the Ordinance regulates conflicting 
property interests arising out of a landlord's self enforcement of a private parking lot independent 
of any state action. Although Plaintiffs arguments suggest the Ordinance encourages certain 
commensurate, illegal lien situations, recent, binding case law does not support this analogy. In 
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Goichman, the Tenth Circuit expressly held "that requiring an individual to post the equivalent 
fof] a bond ... [for disputed towing charges and parking fees] pending a hearing on the underlying 
violation does not violate due process." 859 F.2d at 1468 (emphasis added). The Goichman 
Court then went on to specifically distinguished the Fuentes line of cases, asserting the 
distinction in Fuentes and other creditor/debtor replevin cases is the state's injecting actions, as 
an intervener, which unjustly altered the balance of power in the parties relationship. Id. at 1469-
70. To Goichman, towing cases (and booting cases) were different because the state makes no 
claim on the res, rather the actions stem from the state's legitimate welfare and police powers, 
and ready access to a post-deprivation hearing exists. Id. at 1470. While the Plaintiff may persist 
that Saukstelis, Wilson, Sutton, Haefner, Patterson, Gillam, 39 Am Jur. 2d Highways, Streets, 
and Bridges §349, §353, §358 and §369 stand for the principle that any legislative enactment 
involving booting requires, pursuant to the Due Process Clause, a guaranteed post-deprivation 
hearing, those cases are distinguishable in that they all involve state actors initiating the booting 
or towing or towing and booting on public property by booters or towers contracted with a state 
actor. Here, the Landlord makes no claim on the vehicle but seeks only to alleviate improper 
parking. And although the Plaintiff does have a protected interest in his personal property, the 
state is not involved in the decision to boot, the Landlord continually holds an expressed right to 
regulate the private parking lot, and the Landlord or its contracted agent (the Booter) initiated the 
boot. 
Fourth, the Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Weinrauch, Goichman, and City of Los Angeles is 
inaccurate. While admitting that a pre-deprivation hearing may not be required, the Plaintiff 
asserts that Weinrauch, Goichman, and City of Los Angeles is not completely on point because 
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the Landlord hired a licensed booter who, acting as a private party under contract with the 
Landlord, was allowed to initiate booting for profit. In Goichman, the Tenth Circuit held "due 
process is a flexible concept, and its procedural protections will vary depending on the particular 
deprivation involved." Id. at 1468; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The 
Goichman Court also held that the payment of towing fees does not violate due process so long 
as a hearing was available on the underlying violation. 859 F.2d at 1469. Plaintiff believes that 
Weinrauch, Goichman, and City of Los Angeles still requires the City to assure that a hearing is 
available and that the Ordinance does not address this due process concern, regardless of the 
availability of the traffic or small claims court. 
Looking at City of Los Angeles City, the U.S. Supreme Court set forward a three-factor 
test in Mathews as an additional test to measure adequate due process is found in towing/booting 
cases. According to City of Los Angeles, the Court should weigh three factors, (1) the level of 
private interest affected by the official action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation in light of the 
value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the governmental interests 
involved. 538 U.S. at 717 (paraphrased). Applying the Mathews test to this case, the Defendants' 
approach is correct. Here, the level of private interests, the tenants or non-tenants vehicles 
deprived by booting and the loss of Landlord's parking space create sufficient conflicting private 
interests, which arguably are not affected by the Ordinance because the same conflicts and ability 
to initiate booting existed prior to the Ordinance's enactment. The risk of erroneous deprivation 
may exist, but the Ordinance seeks to protect the tenant from such risks in Section E, F, and G 
thereof, by creating criminal liability for charging an excessive or unlisted fee, failing to 
informed the Plaintiff of the booting practice, or failing to be informed on parking enforcement 
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regarding regular or visitor parking. Lastly, the governmental interest involved in the regulating 
of private landlord/tenant parking lots is minimal. The City's Ordinance interest in insuring its 
citizens are protected from wrongful self-help actions is counter-balanced by the deterring 
possibility of criminal liability and the Plaintiffs availability to assert a wrongful self-help cause 
of action in the City's small claims court. 
City Authority 
Next, the Plaintiff argues the City lacks the authority to pass an ordinance which conflicts 
with general law. To the Plaintiff, the Ordinance conflicts with the general law governing certain 
self-help nuisance abatement remedies, certain police powers over quasi-public parking lots, and 
certain specially injured persons exercising self-help. Responding, Defendant counter the 
Ordinance was drafted pursuant to the City's business license powers under U.C.A. §10-1-203 
and its general welfare powers found in U.C.A. §10-8-84. Reviewing Hansen and Keller, the 
Court finds no basis or merit in Plaintiffs arguments. As previously discussed, the Plaintiff has 
not demonstrated a special injury existed, producing the ability to exert a self-help nuisance 
abatement remedy. Erickson, 877 P.2d 144. Additionally, the Landlord's parking lot does not 
constitute a quasi-public parking lot. Therefore, the Court agrees with the City that the state's 
involvement does not unlawfully exceed into areas outside the City's valid authority to regulate 
business licenses and the general welfare of its citizens, under U.C.A. §10-1-203 and U.C.A. 
§10-8-84. 
Other Constitutional Concerns 
Lastly, the Plaintiff argues the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary and 
capricious and unclear in that it allows landlords to issue parking permits in excess to actually 
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spaces, in its application to non-landlord/tenant quasi-public parking lots, and its notice 
requirements. Despite the Plaintiffs characteristics of the Ordinance's notice provisions in 
Section E as vague, the Plaintiff clearly enjoys the benefits of Section F, which requires landlords 
to explain their parking restrictions. Thus, Plaintiff has greater notification rights than others 
parking in either quasi-public or private parking lots with three or less parking spaces under 
Section F. The Plaintiffs other arguments are inappropriate under a vagueness challenge and 
have previously been addressed under the Court's City of Los Angeles analysis. • 
Conclusion 
For the forgoing reasons, the Court denies the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
and grants the City's Motion to Dismiss and Defendant Landlord and Defendant's Booter's 
Motion to Dismiss. Counsel for the City is directed to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this / 5 ^ d a y of July, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
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